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Conflict of Laws and the International Licensing of
Industrial Property in the United States, the
European Union, and Japan
G. Chin Chao
I. Introduction
Licensing, an approach between direct investment and
exportation, has gained popularity as an effective first way to
penetrate foreign markets. Particularly in the high-tech sector, the
licensing of intellectual property rights as a means of entry has
become the modus operandi for many enterprises. One reason for
this trend is the increased protection of intellectual property
abroad.' As more countries have recognized the importance of
intellectual property and its protection within their own countries,
the opportunities for international licensing have grown
dramatically.
Negotiating an intellectual property license, however, is not an
easy task. A licensor must ascertain what rights to license,
whether the rights licensed will be exclusive or non-exclusive, and
whether the rights will be limited in duration, territory, or
otherwise. The parties must also determine if the license will bear
royalties or be fully paid-up, whether cross-licensing or
sublicensing is allowed, and procedures for dispute resolution.
Despite their efforts, the contracting parties cannot anticipate
every contingency. One provision that should be included but is
sometimes left out2 is what law applies when there is a dispute
over the contract. Is it the law of the country where the contract
was negotiated? The law where the suit was brought? The law of
the licensor's country? The law of the licensee's country? Or the
law of someplace else altogether? In the international setting, this

See generally, Thomas McCarrol, Creativity: Whose Bright Idea?, TIME, June
10, 1991, at 44 (discussing the increasing importance of protecting intellectual
property).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 91-93.
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omission can have the unexpected result of subjecting one party to
the laws and courts of a foreign country.
This "law of the contract," as that term is used by courts and
commentators, describes the laws of a given legal system that
govern matters arising out of or relating to a specific contract. It
governs inter alia the formation, interpretation and validity,
termination, rights and duties of the parties, the mode of
performance, and the consequences of breach This paper focuses4
on the law of the contract in the context of industrial property
licenses and how that law is determined. In particular, this paper
examines the approaches taken by the European Union,5 the
United States, and Japan in determining the law of the contract.
These three systems not only provide a varied approach but also
constitute a large proportion of the world's intellectual property
licensing activity. Part II begins by detailing the scope of this
paper's inquiry and its limitations.6 Part III examines the situation
where the contracting parties have specified the law of the contract
through a choice of law provision.7 Part IV then discusses how the
three regions approach the problem when the parties have failed to
make this choice.8 Finally, Part V explores the problems
implicated by the systems' different approaches.9
Part VI
concludes that although heading in the right direction, the efforts
to harmonize industrial property laws are not yet complete, leaving
licensing as the key tool for entering foreign markets with some
measure of protection.

3 E.g., Friedrich-Karl Beier, Conflict of Law Problems of Trademark License
Agreements, 13 I.I.C. 162, 170,(1982).

1 As used in this article, industrial property refers to patents, industrial designs,
trademarks, and service marks.
5 The European Union consists of fifteen countries: France, Germany, Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark,
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. The European Union was
previously known as the European Economic Community but changed its name
following the signing and entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty in November of
1993. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 247.
6 See infra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 23-9.1 and accompanying text.

8 See infra notes 92-147 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
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II. Background and Scope
The nature of industrial property and industrial property rights
complicates conflict of laws analyses. Industrial property is
inherently intangible. Although manifesting itself in physical
objects, it is in fact a form of information. In this way, it is
inexhaustible. Any number of individuals can use industrial
property simultaneously, while in different locations, without
depleting it. This concept frustrates conflict of laws analysis
property does not
because, unlike real property, industrial
10
location.
specific
a
in
exist
conceptually
On the other hand, industrial property rights are territorial in
nature. Both the conditions for obtaining these rights and their
subsequent protection depend on the specific country granting
them." There is no universal patent. For example, to obtain a
U.S. patent, a person must satisfy the requirements of U.S. patent
law. If that same person then wants a German patent, he would
have to separately meet the requirements of German patent law.
Meeting the requirements of U.S. patent law has nothing to do
with obtaining a German patent. 2 They are independent of one
another.' Moreover, once granted, the general rule is that these
10 PROFESSOR DR. EUGEN

ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE

7 (Kluwer trans., 1978). Real property is usually subject to the law
of the country where it resides.
" Article 2 of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property
mandates national treatment "provided that the conditions and formalities imposed upon
nationals are complied with." Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,
July 14, 1967, art. 2, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) also incorporates this
national treatment plus formality approach. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Apr. 15 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex IC,art. 3, 33 I.L.M. 81, 85-86
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. It did, however, make inroads in the patent area
by defining what is protectable and specifying the rights of patent holders and defining
what is protectable. TRIPS Agreement, supra, arts. 27, 28, 33 I.L.M. at 93-94.
12 Under TRIPS, the filing of a patent application or trademark application in a
member country only gives that person a right of priority for any subsequent filings in
other GATT member countries. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 4, 33 I.L.M. at
86. The Patent Cooperation Treaty also allows an applicant to file one patent
application and have it apply to designated member countries. Patent Cooperation
Treaty, with regulations, June 19, 1970, art. 11, 28 U.S.T. 7645. However, the patent
must still meet the individual requirements of member countries. Id. art. 27(5).
13 The Paris Convention explicitly recognizes this in Article 4 (1). "Patents
applied for in the various countries of the Union by persons entitled to the benefit of the
CONFLICT OF LAWS
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rights are protectable only within the granting territory. 4
Therefore, a U.S. patent holder would have no cause of action
against a manufacturer making and selling, solely in Germany, an
invention that infringes that U.S. patent. 5 The U.S. patent holder,
however, would have a cause of action against that same
manufacturer if he held a German patent over the same invention.
Because industrial property rights stem from the country
granting the right, or what commentators deem the "protecting
country,"" certain matters are governed exclusively by the law of
the protecting country and not the law of the contract. 7 These
include, inter alia, the rights that can be assigned and licensed,8
whether the rights can be licensed exclusively or partially and to
whom, 9 the rights that a licensee has against third-party
infringers," and how an industrial property right originates and
terminates. 2 1 As mentioned earlier, other issues such as the
formation, termination, interpretation and validity, rights and
duties of the parties, the mode of performance, and consequences
of breach, are subject to the law of the contract.22 In this way, the
Union shall be independent of patents obtained for the same invention in other countries,
whether members of the Union or not." Paris Convention, supra note 11, art. 2.
14 ULMER, supra note 10, at 10-11 ("the field of application of national laws is
restricted to infringements committed within the country concerned"). However, TRIPS
gives some extraterritoriality effect to domestic process patents by giving the owner the
exclusive right to exclude others from importing products made from the patented
process. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 28, 33 I.L.M, at 93-94.
'5 ULMER, supra note 10, at 14-18. However, within the EU, a suit alleging the
infringement of an industrial property right can be brought in the defendant country's
domicile or in the country where the injury occurs. Id. at 16.
16 Professor Ulmer defines the law of the protecting country "as the law of the state
for whose territory protection is claimed." ULMER, supra note 10, at 11. The protecting
country is "the territory of the granting state." Paul Torremans, Choice-of-Law
Problems in InternationalIndustrialPropertyLicenses, 25 I.I.C. 390, 392 (1994).
17 Most commentators simply assume this fact because it necessarily follows from
principles of territoriality. See Beier, supra note 3, at 177; Torremans, supra note 12, at
392. For industrial property, the tie with the protecting country is even stronger than
with copyright because each country has its own specific formalities associated with
obtaining industrial property rights. This makes even more cogent the argument for
applying the law of protecting country exclusively to issues stemming from the
industrial property.
18 Torremans, supra note 16, at 392; ULMER, supra note 10, at 90.
19 Torremans, supra note 16, at 392; ULMER, supra note 10, at 90.
supra note 10, at 91.
21 Torremans, supra note 16, at 392.
22 Unfortunately, not every issue cleanly fits into one category or the other. Some
20 ULMER,
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territorial nature of industrial property rights complicates conflict
of laws analyses by necessitating a distinction between issues
governed by the law of the protecting country and the law of the
contract. This paper's focus, however, is on the proper law of the
contract and how such law is determined.
III. Express Choice of Law
The European Union, the United States, and Japan all begin
with the same position that contracting parties are free to choose
the law governing their contract. Each system limits this choice in
certain circumstances, however. Knowing what instances trigger
these limits is important for keeping one's choice intact. This
section outlines the legal framework from which the parties'
choice is made and discusses limits to party autonomy.
A. European Union (EU)and the EEC Rome Convention on
the Law Applicable to ContractualObligations
The starting point in the EU is the EEC Rome Convention on
the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations.23 Signed on June
19, 1980, the EEC Convention eventually came into effect on
April 1, 1991.24

Article 1 sets forth its scope: "The rules of this

Convention shall apply to contractual obligations in any situation
involving a choice between the laws of different countries."25 For
issues have characteristics of both. Determining whether to apply the law of protecting
country or the law of the contract is beyond the scope of this paper. For an excellent
discussion of the conflict between the law of the protecting country and the law of the
contract in the copyright context, see Paul Edward Geller, Harmonizing CopyrightContract Conflicts Analyses, COPYRIGHT, Feb. 1989, at 49.
23 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980,
1980 O.J. (L266) [hereinafter EEC Convention].
24 For a history of the negotiations and how this agreement came into existence,
see P.M. North, The E.C.C. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual
Obligations (1980): Its History and Main Features, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS: THE
E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY 3 (P.M. North ed., 1982). The Convention is not yet in force
regarding Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, and Sweden. With regards to Spain and
Portugal, the EEC Convention was opened for signature on May 18, 1992. 199 O.J.
L333. Because Austria, Finland, and Sweden only recently joined the EU, the EEC
Convention has not yet been opened for signature for these countries.
25 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 1. Article 1, however, fails to provide a
definition of what is a "contractual obligation." Thus, self interested parties and
potentially result-oriented courts could potentially avoid the effects of the EEC
Convention by describing their transactions as noncontractual. Moreover, the rules of
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example, although industrial property by itself does not fall within
the confines of this definition,26 a contract licensing that industrial
property does fall within its scope.27 It both creates contractual
obligations, in this case between a licensor and licensee, and
involves a choice-of-law determination between different
countries
1. Party Autonomy.
Article 3(1) states the general rule that the law of a contract is
the law chosen by the contracting parties. 9 This choice can be
made or changed at any time," and the parties can specify whether
the law applies to the entire contract or to just one part.3 The only
requirement is that the parties' choice be "expressed or
demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the
contract or the circumstances of the case. 32 The parties are
the EEC Convention do not apply to questions involving the status or legal capacity of
natural persons, contractual obligations relating to wills and succession, rights in
matrimonial property, rights and duties arising out of a family relationship, obligations
relating to certain negotiable instruments, arbitration agreements, questions governed by
corporate law, questions of agency, contracts for.insurance, evidence and procedure, and
the constitution of trusts. Id. arts. ](2)-(3).
26 Mario Giuliano and Paul Lagarde, Report on the Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS: THE E.E.C.
CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE TO CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE

STUDY 355, 364 (P.M. North ed., 1982).
27 Torremans, supra note 16,.at 393; cf Beier, supra note 3, at 165 (assuming,

without stating, that the EEC Convention applies to international trademark licenses).
Industrial property licenses do not fall within the's carve-out exceptions of Article 1(2).
See supra note 25.
28 The language of Article 1(1) states that the EEC Convention applies to
"contractual obligations in any situation involving a choice" between different laws.
EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 1(1). Therefore, the EEC Convention is not limited
to international cases but applies to matters of a purely domestic nature. Allan Philip,
Mandatory Rules, Public Law (Political Rules) and Choice of Law in the E.E.C.
Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, in CONTRACT
CONFLICTS: THE E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAW APPLICABLE To CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 81, 94 (P.M. North ed., 1982).
29 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(1). This rule simply expressed the
existing law of all Member States of the EEC. Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at
369.
30 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(2). The only limitation is that any
change after the conclusion of the contract cannot threaten the contract's validity or
adversely affect third-party rights. Id.
31 Id.art. 3(1).
32 Id. The parties may select a particular law because the selected law is
particularly well-developed and concerns the subject matter of the contract, because the
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therefore able to choose any country's law, even if such country
has no direct relationship to the transaction or parties involved.33
Article 3(1) also addresses the possibility that the parties may
have implied a real choice of law even though their choice is not
expressly stated.34 Giuliano and Lagarde, in their report on the
Convention, cite several examples where this might occur. For
instance, the parties may have consistently stipulated a specific
choice of law in their prior dealings but neglected to do so in their'
most recent transaction." A court could then select the law
previously chosen to govern their current contract if the
circumstances do not indicate a deliberate change by the parties. 7
In other cases, the form of the contract may specifically implicate
a particular country's law even though there is no express
statement to this effect.3" For example, legal terminology in the
contract may be particular to a specific country or the use of a
certain language may indicate the parties' implied intention.
Finally, when the parties have specified a particular forum to
handle any disputes, it may be that the parties also intended the
law of that forum to govern their contract. Article 3(1), however,
does not permit a court to infer a choice of law when the
circumstances indicate the parties had no clear intention of making
or inferring a choice.4° Courts in this instance must follow Articles
selected law is familiar to the contracting parties, or because the selected law is
"neutral."
33 There is some disagreement as to whether an arbitrary choice of law is allowed.
See Alfred E. Von Overbeck, Contracts: The Swiss Draft Statute Compared with the
E.E.C. Convention, in CONTRACT CONFLICTS: THE E.E.C. CONVENTION ON THE LAW
APPLICABLE To CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 269, 271 (P.M.

North ed., 1982) (stating that there is no limitation on the parties' autonomy). But see
Beier, supra note 3, at 165 (stating that the EEC Convention prohibits an arbitrary
choice of law). As noted by Beier, however, this disagreement has more theoretical than
practical importance since it is the rare instance where the parties cannot articulate some
interest in the chosen law. Id.
31 Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at 371.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38

Id.

39 Id.

11 Id. This would simply be substituting a court's own judgment for that of the
parties without resort to any specific guidelines. Even under a theory of being a penalty
default provision, there exists too great a potential for arbitrariness.
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2. Limitations.
While Article 3(1) sets forth the broad grant of party
autonomy, other articles of the EEC Convention cut back on this
autonomy and give courts discretion, in certain instances, to
determine which law to apply to the contract. Article 3(3)
provides that if all relevant elements of the contract point to a
single country, the parties' choice of law cannot evade the
application of what the EEC Convention defines as that country's
"mandatory rules."4'2 The EEC Convention defines mandatory
rules as those rules "which cannot be derogated from by
contract. 4 3 Many antitrust laws are mandatory rules. 44 Therefore,
if two German companies cross-licensed German technology for
performance in Germany, Article 3(3) would prevent them from
avoiding German antitrust law by choosing Swiss law. Other
mandatory rules that often affect industrial property licenses
include tax and currency exchange laws, technology transfer laws,
and anti-competition laws.45
Mandatory rules again appear in Articles 5, 6, 7, and 9(6).
This paper discusses Articles 5, 6, and 7 since only these articles
have relevance to industrial property licenses." Article 5 is
concerned with certain consumer contracts and states that the
parties' choice of law in Article 3(1) cannot deprive a consumer of
the protection afforded her by the mandatory rules of her country
41

See discussion infra part IV.

42 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(3). Whether a rule is mandatory depends
on the legal system to which that rule belongs. If that legal system does not permit that
rule to be contractually avoided, the EEC Convention "does not allow its avoidance
through contracting out of the system." David Jackson, Mandatory Rules and Rules of
"Ordre Public," in CONTRACT CONFLICTS: THE E.E.C. CONVENTION ON TH LAW
APPLICABLE To CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 59, 65-66 (P.M.
North ed., 1982).
43EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 3(3).
4 Beier, supra note 3, at 167-69.
45 Id.; Torremans, supra note 16, at 393-94; see also Guillermo Cabanellas, Jr.,
Applicable Law Under International Transfer of Technology Regulations, 15 IIC 39
(1984) (describing in general the various technology transfer regulations). EEC Articles
85 and 86 and its Directive on Block Exemptions meet this definition of mandatory
rules.
46 Article 9(6) pertains to immovable property.
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of habitual residence. With regard to industrial property rights,
mandatory rules in Germany, for example, can make it impossible
for a German licensee of a foreign trademark owner to incorporate
a foreign law clause in its contracts with customers. 7 While
Article 5 pertains to certain consumer contracts, Article 6 is
concerned with employment contracts. Article 6 prevents the
parties' choice from depriving an employee of the protection
offered him by the mandatory employment protection laws of the
country where he carries out his work.48 This occurs in the context
of certain agreements not to compete. Further, the appearance of
mandatory rules in Article 7 serves a different purpose and takes
on a narrower meaning than its previous references. 9 While the
term was previously used to limit party autonomy, its purpose in
Article 7 is to provide a court with discretion to apply the laws of
another country if certain conditions are met. The term here is
narrower because the law in question must be one which the
parties cannot derogate from by contract, and the legal system to
which the law belongs must apply it regardless of the law
applicable to the contract. Commentators describe Article 7's
subset of mandatory rules as international mandatory rules." In
Article 7(1), this means that, even if the law of Country A governs
the contract, 5' a court has discretion to apply Country B's law if (1)
the situation has a close connection with Country B, (2) the law is
mandatory as that term is defined in Article 3(3), and (3) Country
B requires the law's application no matter what law governs the
contract. Similarly, Article 7(2) allows the forum in certain
situations to apply forum law regardless of the proper law of the

47 Beier, supra note 3, at 169. The EU recently passed a directive setting minimum
standards for unfair terms in consumer contracts. EC Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29. See generally Ewoud Hondius, Council
Directive 93/12 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts: Towards a European Law of
Contract,7 J. CONT. L. 34 (1994) (explaining the various provisions of the directive).
48 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 6.
49 Id. arts. 7(1), 7(2); Philip, supra note 28, at 81. Philip argues Article 7
constitutes an "escape clause, making it possible in certain circumstances to avoid the
application of the rules of the Convention."Philip, supra note 28, at 100.
50 North, supra note 24, at 19; Philip, supra note 28, at 100-01.

51 This may be by party choice or, in the absence of that choice, through a court
determination addressing that issue. Court determination absent party choice is
discussed in Section IV infra.
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contract." It recognizes that some forum interests are fundamental
and refuses to restrict the application of forum law in these
instances.53 Giuliano and Lagarde specifically mention that laws
relating to cartels, competition and restrictive practices, and
consumer protection are of this character.14 In considering whether
to apply an international mandatory rule, the EEC Convention
requires a court to take into account its "nature and purpose and
... the consequences of [its] application or non-application." 55
Article 16 provides the final limitation on party.autonomy. It
permits a forum to reject a chosen law on the grounds of "ordre
public. 56 Although similar to a mandatory rule, the difference is
that a mandatory rule constitutes part of the process of selecting
the applicable law while "ordre public" is a method of rejecting
the applicable law." The forum may reject a chosen law only "if
such application is manifestly incompatible"" with forum public
policy. Although the EEC Convention does not define "manifestly
incompatible," it must mean something more than the fact that the
chosen law differs in some aspects from forum law. Otherwise,
any slight difference between the chosen law and forum law could
potentially negate the parties' express choice, and the law applied
would revert to that of the forum. This would severely undercut
the notion of party autonomy embodied in Article 3(1). For
industrial property licenses, areas that may rise to levels which
may offend public policy include certain restrictions on the
licensee,59 antitrust laws, 6° and employee covenants not to

52 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 7(2). Again, the proper law of the contract
could be by party choice or, in the absence of that choice, by a court determining which
country's law is the proper law of the contract. Id.

53 See id.

51 Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at 382. EEC Articles 85 and 86 and its
Directive on Block Exemptions also meet this definition.
11 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 7(1).
56

Id. art. 16.

17

Jackson, supra note 42, at 62.

58 Id.
59 Cabanellas, supra note 45, at 46.

For example, export restrictions on the

licensee have been held to violate public policy. Id. & n.3 1.
60 Id. Many of the same laws considered mandatory under Article 3(3) are also
mandatory as that term is used here. Id.
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compete. 61
B. The United States and the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws
The legal framework in the United States resides in the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. 62 Most states have
adopted the Restatement (Second) for determining the applicable
law of the contract. 63 The Restatement (Second) pertains to all
"contracts" and applies that term to "legally enforceable promises
and to other agreements or promises which are claimed to be
enforceable but are not legally so. '64 Industrial property licenses
necessarily fall into this category because of the binding promises
made between a licensor and licensee. The Restatement (Second)
also specifically mentions its applicability to international
contracts.65
1. PartyAutonomy.
The starting point for the Restatement (Second) is section
187(1). It provides contracting parties with the freedom to
explicitly choose the law governing their contract.66 Moreover,
courts may find that the parties implied a choice-of-law if the
contract uses legal terms or makes reference to specific legal
doctrines unique to the law of a particular state or country.67 The
61 EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 640-42 (1982).
62 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

(1971)

[hereinafter

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
63 Section 187 is universally accepted. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), app. (1995)
(citing cases). Every state to consider it has cited it favorably. Id. Section 188 is almost
universally excepted. Id. Forty-six states adhere to section 188: Nebraska is split on the
issue; Georgia and New Mexico use lex loci contractus, the place of contracting, and
Rhode Island has yet to decide. Id. A federal court will apply the conflicts principles of
the State in which the court sits. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 61, at 148.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 62, Chapter 8 introductory note. The
Restatement (Second) explicitly covers four areas not covered by the EEC Convention:
certain insurance contracts, status and capacity, negotiable instruments, and arbitration.
Id. §§ 193, 198, 214-217, 218-220.
65 Id. § 10.
66 Section 187(1) reads as follows: "The law of the state chosen by the parties to
govern their contractual rights and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one
which the parties could have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement
directed to that issue." Id. § 187(1).
67 Id. § 187 cmt. a. See infra note 74 for a discussion on the Restatement's
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1986 Revisions of the Restatement (Second) also explicitly
provides that contracting parties may choose different laws to
govern different issues of their contract. 6' This permits flexibility.
Contracting parties can take advantage of a state's sophistication
on a particular issue (Delaware corporate law for example) without
otherwise having to subject all issues of the contract to that state's
law.
2. Limitations.
As with the EEC Convention, the Restatement (Second) places
limitations on party autonomy. First, it requires a court to respect
the parties' selection unless the selected law has no "substantial"
relationship to the transaction and there exists no reasonable basis
for the parties' choice. 69 The "substantial" relationship prong
reflects the approach taken by cases prior to the Restatement
(Second). Although the earlier cases required only a "reasonable"
relationship, the Restatement (Second) substantial relationship test
has not resulted in a stricter, more functional approach."
Connections which count as being substantial include: (1) place of
contract formation; (2) place of performance; (3) domiciles of the
licensor and licensee; and (4) licensor's and licensee's place of
incorporation, place of corporate headquarters, and place of branch
offices.7' Section 187(2)(a)'s reasonable basis prong permits
parties to choose an unrelated law as long as they have a
reasonable basis for doing so. This prong broadens the scope of
party autonomy from what was allowed under prior case law.72
Comment f to section 187 gives as an example two parties
selecting a country's law based on their knowledge of the
country's law and on the law's sophistication.73
Under the Restatement (Second), a court may also reject the
definition of the term "state."
68 Id. § 187 cmt. I. Before these revisions, it was unclear whether parties could
choose different laws to govern different issues. Id.
70

Id. § 187(2)(a).
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 61, at 647.

71

Id. at 645-47.

72

Id. at 648 n.l.

69

73 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 62, § 187 cmt. f, see also supra note 32 and

accompanying text.
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parties' choice if (1) application of that law to an issue would
violate the public policy of the state74 which has the most
significant relationship to the transaction and (2) the "most
significant" state has a materially greater interest in resolving the
particular issue than the chosen state does.75 In deciding which
state has the most significant relationship, section 187 refers to
section 188. Section 188, in turn, considers the following co-equal
factors in determining the state with the most significant
relationship: the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the
place of performance, the location of the subject matter, and the
domicile, residence, place of incorporation or place of business of
the parties. However, if the place of negotiation and the place of
performance occur in the same state, there is a rebuttable
presumption that that state is the most significant state.76 This first
prong resembles in many respects Article 16 of the EEC
Convention, which rejects a choice of law on the grounds of ordre
public. After satisfying the first prong, the second prong requires
a comparison of the relative interests between the chosen forum
and the state with the most significant relationship. In comparing
interests, comment (g) states that the more contacts the transaction
has with the chosen state, the stronger the fundamental policy of
the "most significant" state must be to overcome the parties'
choice.77
While the Restatement (Second) deals with the law of the
contract, international industrial property licenses concerning U.S.
companies and/or technology are also subject to various U.S. laws
and regulations. These include tax laws, antitrust guidelines,78
export restrictions,79 and foreign currency exchange practices.
74 The term "state" in the Restatement (Second) is not used in the political sense. It
refers to "a territorial unit with a distinct general body of law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
supra note 62, § 3. Therefore, every State of the United States is a "state" under the
definition, as are countries of the world. Id. cmt. a.
75 Id. § 187(2)(b).
76 Id. § 188(3).
77 Id. § 188 cmt. g.
78 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR
THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1995)

[hereinafter

ANTITRUST GUIDELINES].

79 For example, exporters of computer software with encryption capabilities may
run afoul of government export regulations. See generally Dorothy E. Denning and
William E. Baugh, Jr., Decoding Encryption Policy, SECURIFY MANAGEMENT, Feb.
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These laws are analogous to the EEC Convention's Article 3(3)
definition of a mandatory rule since contracting parties cannot
contract out of these laws and regulations. Depending on the
circumstances, some would also qualify as an international
mandatory rule."0
C. Japan
Unlike the United States, Japan is a civil law country; thus, its
conflict of laws rules reside primarily in statutes. The main source
is in the Horei, or Act Concerning the. Application of Laws.8 It is
the statute which codifies the Japanese private international laws.
Because the rules within the Horei are brief, Japanese case law
and, to a lesser extent custom,82 aid in interpreting and
supplementing the Horei.
1. Freedom of Contract.
As in both the EU and the United States, Japanese laws allow
contracting parties to specify the law of the contract.83 Licenses,
including international industrial property licenses are within the
definition of contract." The scope of party autonomy is greater in
Japan than in both the EU and the United States. Parties can freely
choose a choice-of-law having absolutely no relationship to the
1996, at 59.
80 The

GUIDELINES specifically state that its principles apply to
international licensing arrangements. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 78, at 3. For
example if a French licensor, as a condition to granting a license, forbids its U.S.
licensee from selling, distributing, and using competing technologies, the ANTITRUST
GUIDELINES would apply even if the applicable law was French law.
81 Law No. 10 of June 21, 1898, as amended by Law No. 7 of 1942 and Law No.
223 of 1947, Law No. 100 of 1964, and Law No. 27 of 1989 translated in ZENTARO
KITAGAWA, DOING BUSINESS WITH JAPAN, Statute Volume, app. 3B (1995) [hereinafter
cited as KITAGAWA]. The Horei does not apply to legal capacity, wills or familial
relations involving support. Id. arts. 3, 34.
82 The Horei limits the use of custom. See Karen Denise Untiedt, International
Contracts under the Conflict of Laws Rules of Great Britain and Japan, 7 Loy. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 193 (1984).
83 The parties' intention determines what country's law governs what the Horei
call a "juristic act." Horei art. 7(1), translatedin KITAGAWA, supra note 81. The Horei
defines a juristic act as an act "which effects a legal consequence according to the
manifestation of the intent of the parties...." Untiedt, supra note 82, at 200; see also
KITAGAWA, supra note 81, Notes on Basic Legal Terms.
84 6 KITAGAWA, supra note 81, § 6.02[l].
ANTITRUST

1996]

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LICENSING

transaction or the parties." For example, the parties could choose
the law of the Bahamas simply because of the weather.
Consistent with practices in the EU and the United States,
Japanese courts will attempt to ascertain from the circumstances of
the case whether the parties implied a choice of law. The Japanese
courts consider the following factors in making their
determination: (1) the form and content of the contract; (2) the
language that the contract was written in; (3) the parties'
nationalities; (4) the subject matter of the contract; and (5) the
existence of jurisdiction or arbitration clauses. 6
2. Limitations.
The first limitation to party autonomy is the ever-present
public policy limitation. Article 30 of the Horei provides that any
provision of an otherwise applicable law will not apply if contrary
to the "public order and good morals" of Japan. 7 This doctrine,
although seldom used, occurs most frequently in employment
contract cases. 8 Nevertheless, public policy limitations remain a
potential tool to negate the application of an otherwise valid
foreign law.
As in' the United States, international industrial property
licenses in Japan are subject to various regulations that the EEC
Convention would call mandatory rules and international

85 Untiedt, supra note 82, at 200-01. "[T]he parties' choice is decisive, rather than
merely a circumstantial factor in the determination of the governing law. Moreover, the
Horei does not require 'substantial contacts' or 'reasonable relationships' or 'good faith'
in the parties' choice of governing laiv." Yasuhiro Fujita, TransnationalLitigationConflict of Laws, in 14 KITAGAWA, supra note 81, at XIV 5-53. Japanese commentators,
however, have proposed various limitations on this right. Untiedt, supra note 82, at
200-01.
86 Untiedt, supra note 82, at 208. Some courts have also looked to the conduct of
the parties, including conduct after the contract is formed. Id. at 208 n.87 (citing Multi
Product Int'l v. Tao Kogyo Co., Tokyo District Court, Hanreiiibo, No. 863 (1977) at
100, Apr. 22, 1977).
87 Horei art. 33, translatedin K1TAGAWA, supra note 81.
88 Untiedt, supra note 82, at 221. Untiedt cites a case in which a Japanese court
sustained an unfair labor practices complaint even though his U.S. counterpart had been
unsuccessful in seeking relief on the same claim in the U.S. The court reasoned that
even though the intention of the parties was to apply U.S. law, the court nevertheless
applied Japanese law to effectuate the Japanese public policy embodied'in its labor laws.
Id. n.170.
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mandatory rules.89 In Japan, these include the Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Act (Revised FECA) and the
Antimonopoly and Fair Trade Maintenance Act (Antimonopoly
Act). Under the Revised FECA, parties to an international
industrial property right or know-how license which concerns the
import of technology must give prior notice to the Ministry of
Finance and to the Ministry having jurisdiction over the industry
involved. 0 The Antimonopoly Act requires parties to international
licensing agreements, where one party is Japanese, to report the
agreements to the Fair Trade Commission for screening.9"
IV. The Law of the Contract in the Absence of an Express
Choice
Since all three systems generously allow contracting parties to
select the law governing their contract, one would expect that
every international license contains a choice-of-law provision. An
explicit choice would save courts the difficult task of making this
determination and spare the parties the uncertainty of what law
governs. However, some international licenses do not have a
choice-of-law provision, not because the parties did not think
about it beforehand but because they could not agree on the
applicable law. Beier believes this to be more of a psychological
obstacle than anything else.92 He argues that parties are often
unable to agree on a choice of law out of suspicion of the other
party's law, fearful it contains unpleasant surprises for the
unwary. 9' In other situations, one or both of the parties might feel
a loss of prestige if they were to agree to the law proposed by the

89 EEC Convention, supra note 23, arts. 3(3), 7.

90 6 KITAGAWA, supra note 81, at 6-7. This law is an international mandatory rule
as long as one of the parties is Japanese and the license involves the import of
technology into Japan. Id. Japanese courts must apply this law irrespective of the proper
law of the contract. Id.
91 Id. Certain restrictive clauses are illegal in Japan. In particular to patent
licenses, most of these deal with antitrust concerns and unfair business practices. For
example, licensors cannot usually restrict the licensee's sale price of patented goods or
require the licensee not to use competing technology after termination or expiration of
the license. Yoshio Ohara, InternationalLicensing, in 9 KITAGAWA, supra note 81, at
ch. 8.
92 Beier, supra note 3, at 164.
93 Id.
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other party.94 For whatever reason, whenever the contract is silent
on the applicable law, the courts must make the determination. In
doing so, courts strive to balance societal concerns for uniformity
and predictability against notions of individual justice.95
Protecting societal interests requires this balance to tilt in the
direction of applying rigid rules. On the other hand, notions of
individual justice tilt the balance toward case-by-case
adjudication. This section examines where the conflict principles
of the EU, the United States, and Japan lie along this spectrum
between "hard" and "soft" rules.
A. The EU
Compared to Japan and the United States, the EU takes a
middle ground between rigid rules and case-by-case adjudication.
Article 4(1) of the EEC Convention specifies that the proper law
of the contract when the parties have not expressed a choice is the
law of the country with the closest connection.96 Article 4(2)
presumes the country most closely connected with the contract to
be the residence 97 of the party who renders the characteristic
performance of the contract.98 Characteristic performance, in turn,
refers to the contractual obligation that links the contract to the
social and economic fabric of a country. It focuses on what makes
the contract functional and not on "elements unrelated to the
essence of the obligation such as the nationality of the contracting
parties or the place where the contract was concluded." 99 The
presumption of Article 4(2) is rebuttable if the characteristic
performance cannot itself be ascertained or if, from the entirety of
the circumstances, the contract is more closely connected with

94 Id.

& HAY, supra note 61, at 4.
EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(1).

95 SCOLES
96

For
97 For individuals, the EEC Convention uses residence. Id. art. 4(2).
corporations, the EEC Convention uses central administration. Id.
98 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(2). For corporations, the residence is its
central administration. Id.
99 Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at 374. But the licensee in industrial
property licenses does much more than pay royalties. See infra notes 104-06 and
accompanying text.
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another country.' But what is the characteristic performance for
industrial property licenses?
1. CharacteristicPerformanceand Article 4(2).
Commentators have advanced three general positions for
defining the characteristic performance of industrial property
licenses: (1) the licensor's licensing of the industrial property, (2)
the licensee's exploitation of the industrial property right, and (3)
the exploitation of the industrial property. right."' This results in
having the proper law of the contract be the law of the country
where the licensor has its habitual residence or central
administration, the law of the country where the licensee has its
habitual residence or central administration, and the law of the
protecting country, respectively. The first solution argues the
characteristic performance is the licensor's act of.licensing the
industrial property. In this view, the licensor's grant is essential.
It allows the licensee to engage in exploiting and using the
industrial property as well as performing other related activities.
One commentator noted that the characteristic performance is that
of the licensor because the performance of the licensee is simply
the payment of money.' There is some support for this position
in the report on the EEC Convention. It comments that the
characteristic performance is not the remittance of money but "the
granting of the right to make use of an item of property."'0 3 One
advantage of having the law of the licensor's residence be the law
of the contract appears in the situation where a single license grant
encompasses several countries. By following the situs of the
licensor approach, only one law governs the contract.
The second approach regards the licensee's exploitation of the
industrial property right as the characteristic performance.' 0 4 The
proper law of the contract is therefore the law of the country where
the licensee has its habitual residence or central administration. It
'oo EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(5).
1O See generally Torremans, supra note 16.
102 A. Schnitzer, Handbuch Des Internationalen Privatrechts 597 (1958).
103 Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at 374.
104Giovanna Modiano, InternationalPatent Licensing Agreements and Conflict of
Laws, 2 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 11 (1980).
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argues that the licensee's performance is not simply the payment
of money but includes other vital activities which give the contract
meaning. It is the licensee who invests capital and manpower in
the exploitation of the industrial property right. In many cases, the
success of the contract depends on the licensee's exploitation.
Moreover, some commentators argue that it is the licensor's
obligations which are nonessential, since in many instances, they
are limited solely to the receiving of money through royalty
payments."' In this scenario, the licensee's successful exploitation
is the most important issue for the licensor because its income
depends on it. Proponents of this approach contend that this
approach ascertains the true characteristic performance more often
than the law of the licensor approach.0 6
The final solution proposes that the characteristic performance
is the exploitation of the industrial property right itself. Therefore,
the law of the contract is the law of the protecting country.
Proponents of this approach stress the link between the
characteristic performance and the protecting country.0 7 They
argue that often the most important exploitative acts take place in
the protecting country, including the manufacture of the invention
or product and the product's initial introduction into commerce.'0
The law of the licensor's or licensee's habitual residence is not
acceptable because there is not necessarily a connection between
the characteristic performance and their countries of residence. A
company could conduct its business activities out of a country
unrelated to where the exploitation occurs. Finally, proponents
point to the advantage of having a single country's law apply both
to the contractual terms and to the interpretation of the industrial
property right.' 9 They note that this precludes any confusion and
determination as to whether a particular issue is contractual or

105 Id. According to Modiano, the licensor's technical assistance, quality control,
and assistance in the case of infringement does not change this determination. Id. at 2324.
106

Id. at 25-26.

107 Beier, supra note 3, 175-76.
108 Id. at 176. For trademarks, the trademarking of the product also occurs most
often in the protecting country. Id.
109 Torremans, supra note 16, at 403-04.
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should be interpreted as part of the industrial property right."'
2. Strict Application May Be Impractical
Adopting any one of the three approaches above would
promote predictability and uniformity but could also reach unjust
solutions in individual cases. For example, the law of the licensor
and the law of the licensee approaches yield illogical results when
the residence of these parties is unrelated to the industrial property
right. Suppose a German patent holder licenses its German patent
to another German company for manufacture and sale in Germany.
Further, suppose the licensor's corporate headquarters is located in
the Cayman Islands, and the parties failed to specify a choice of
law. A court, applying the law of the licensor approach, would
conclude that Cayman Islands law is the proper law of the
contract. Take the same example but this time suppose the
licensee's corporate headquarters is in the Bahamas. According to
the law of the licensee approach, the laws of the Bahamas would
govern the contract. The problem with these two approaches is
that sometimes the habitual residence or central administration of
the parties is unrelated to the characteristic performance. Utilizing
the laws of the protecting country can also reach an unsatisfactory
result. Beier gives the example of two German companies
concluding a license contract for the exploitation of an invention
trademarked in Korea."' The law of the protecting country
approach dictates that Korean law governs the contract, but the
more appropriate law should be the law familiar to both parties
and not the unfamiliar law of the protecting country. In this
instance, the parties' common place of residence outweighs where
the exploitation occurs. These three examples evince the problem
of following one approach in all situations. The EEC Convention
thus made the characteristic performance presumption rebuttable.
3. Article 4(5).
Article 4(5) is the EEC Convention's attempt to balance, on
the one hand, predictability and uniformity, and, on the other, a
sense of fairness on an individual level. It embodies this balance
110 See supra note 22 and text accompanying supra notes 18-22.
'"

Beier, supra note 3, at 180.
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by allowing a court to rebut the presumption of Article 4(2) if the
characteristic performance cannot be ascertained or if, from the
entirety of the circumstances, the contract is more closely
connected with another country.112 Therefore, a court can use
Article 4(5) when the general application of any of the three
approaches fails to achieve notions of fairness in a particular case.
After invoking Article 4(3), however, a court cannot then make an
arbitrary choice of law. It is still bound by Article 4(1)'s
requirement to determine the proper law of the contract by
reference to the law of the country with the closest connection.
Unlike the extreme examples above, the general approaches do not
usually yield three different outcomes. The approaches point to at
most two different laws, usually that of the licensor and licensee.
The court could then base its decision on which law garnished two
votes using the general approaches, or it could weigh the parties'
obligations against one another. In many cases, one party's
obligations are clearly more essential than the other party's
obligations. Ulmer cites as an example the situation where the
licensee has a duty to exploit the license or is granted an exclusive
license."'
He argues that the characteristic performance here
would be the conduct of the licensee. Article 4(5) combined with
the rebuttable presumption of Article 4(2) take the middle-of-theroad approach in tackling the absence of party choice.
B. The United States
Of the three systems, the Restatement (Second) approach is the
"softest," reflecting a preference for case-by-case adjudication
instead of predictability and uniformity. Section 188(1) of the
Restatement (Second) provides that the law of the contract is the
law of that state which has the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties. In making this determination, section
188(2) directs the court's attention to the five following contacts:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
112 EEC Convention, supra note 23, art. 4(5).
113 ULMER, supra note 10, at 101-02.
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(d) the location of subjectmatter of the contract, and
(e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and.

place of business of the parties. 14

Section 188 contains only one semi-fast rule. Where the state
of performance coincides with the state where the parties
negotiated the contract, section 188(3) presumes that this common
state's law governs the contract.'15 Otherwise, section 188 offers
little guidance on the relative weight of each contact, except to
mention that courts should evaluate these contacts according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue. 116
The issues contemplated here are contractual. The law of the
protecting country governs issues arising directly from the
industrial property right as such. Nevertheless, a court should pay
attention to the fact that the contract's underlying subject matter is
industrial property.
The Restatement (Second) realizes the
importance of the type of contract in other contexts,'17 although not
licensing contracts. For example, the insured's domicile"8 is the
most important contact in life insurance contracts because of the
forum's interest in protecting its residents against adhesion
contracts." 9 Similarly, contacts (c) 2 ' and (e) assume greater
importance for international industrial property licenses. These
contacts encompass all of the possible countries that could possess
the most significant relationship. Contacts (a) and (b), by
themselves, often bear no relation to the transaction or the
parties.'' They should therefore be disregarded. Contact (d)
114

RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note

62, § 188(2).

"I Id. § 188(3).
116 Commentators have criticized section 188 because it provides so little guidance
as to how much weight to give the various criteria. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 61, at

652.
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 62, §§ 189-197.
118

Referring to contact (e).

119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 62, § 192 cmt. c.
120 The place of performance is interpreted broadly and includes the licensor and
licensee's performance.
121 These factors are remnants from the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws,
which incorporated a "hard" rule.. In the absence of choice, the place of contracting was

the proper law of the contract.
(1934).

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 332
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simply does not make sense for industrial property because of its
intangible nature. It should also be ignored. Compared to the
EEC Convention's approach, the Restatement (Second) contacts
cover more countries than the characteristic performance approach
covers. Their focuses are different. While the Restatement
(Second) five contacts examine the contract from external factors,
the EEC Convention looks at the contract from the inside. The
most striking example is that the EEC Convention excludes from
consideration the nationality of the parties, the place where the
contract Was concluded, and the place of contract negotiation.122
More 'differences appear during the next step 'of the
Restatement (Second) analysis. Section 188(2) instructs courts to
analyze the contacts in light of the principles enunciated in section
6. There are seven:
(a) the needs of the interstate 'and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the 'relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
'(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied.'23

As with -section 188(2), section' 6 fails to provide any
indication as to the relative importance of each principle. 2 4 Proper
interpretation, however, is not simply guesswork. The official
comments accompanying sections 6 and 188 provide some
guidance as to how to apply these principles. Principle 6(e) calls
attention to basic policies underlying the particular field of law at
issue. Probably the most important policy, in contract law is
protecting the expectation of the parties.'25 This simply restates
principle 6(d). The problem with applying this principle to the
Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at 374.
supra note 62, § 6.
124 The factors listed vary in importance from field to field and from issue to issue.
Id. § 188 cmt. b.
125 Id.; E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 2 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 305 (1990).
122

123 RESTATEMENT (SECOND),

170
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choice-of-law issue is that the parties have not expressed a choice.
There is no expectation to protect. As to all other contractual
issues, however, the court should choose, out of the possible laws,
the one which upholds the validity of the contract and its
individual terms. Parties enter into contracts with the expectation
that the contract will be valid,
binding upon them, and enforced in
26
1
terms.
its
with
accordance
Principles 6(b) and 6(c) reflect the influence of government
interest analysis.1 17 This conflicts theory is premised on the idea
that with every state law there exists a corresponding state policy
which that law implements. Every state, therefore, has a
governmental interest in effectuating the policies underlying its
own laws. When asked to apply a foreign law, a court should first
determine the policies of the interested jurisdictions' law and the
policies of the forum. It should then examine the circumstances in
which these laws were meant to apply. If the potentially
applicable laws do not differ or if one country's law policy does
not call for its application in this particular situation, there is no
conflict. This situation presents what Currie called a "false
conflict," and the court should apply the country's law which
actually applies.2 8 A true conflict appears when the potential laws
not only differ but also the underlying policies of each call for its
application. In a true conflict situation, Currie would apply the
law of the forum.12 9 In this way, government interest analysis
always leads to applying the law of the forum unless the
underlying policy of forum law does not require its application. 130
Since the Restatement (Second) embodies government interest
analysis, too much emphasis on principles 6(b) and 6(c) may lead
U.S. courts to apply forum law when the contracting parties have
not expressed a choice.'31
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 62, § 188 cmt. b.
127 The leading proponent of government interest analysis is Brainerd Currie.
128 BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 109-10 (1963).
129 Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson-A Recent Development in
Conflict of Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1237-38 (1963).
130 Currie would invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens in these rare
situations to avoid applying a foreign law with which the court is unfamiliar. CURRIE,
supra note 128, at 356-58.
131 SCOLES & HAY, supra note 61, at 665.
126
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The problem. with government interest analysis in the context
of contracts is that it looks at factors external to the contract. It
can therefore derogate from the concept of protecting the parties'
expectations in favor of state policies. This is especially true in
the context of industrial property licenses, where countries have
expressed a significant interest in having their own laws apply to
the contract. By applying their own laws to the contract, countries
can (1) increase the bargaining power of local technology
purchasers; (2) protect local innovation and technology; (3)
improve both the quality and assimilation of imported technology;
(4) limit industrial property protection for foreign parties; (5)
regulate foreign investments made in local technology; and (6)
protect local industry from abusive, unreasonable, and excessively
burdensome contract terms. 13 2 These interests favor the forum in
applying its own law. By not articulating a choice, contracting
parties take the risk that courts will simply apply the law of the
forum as the proper law of the contract, especially in international
industrial property licenses. 3 3 A court has considerably more
discretion in determining how much weight to give state interests
when the parties have not expressed a choice. In contrast, a court
may reject the parties' expressed choice only when it violates
public policy. State concerns,
however, have not generally risen to
34
policy.'
"public
of
level
the
Section 6 also manifests another conflicts theory known as
choice-influencing considerations."' This conflicts theory also
requires the weighing of interests, although it broadens its analysis
to include interests other than those of the forum. These include:
maintenance of interstate and international order, predictability of
132 Cabanellas, supra note 45, at 41; Beier, supra note 3, at 168.
Other interests
include: (1) improving the balance of payments; (2) controlling foreign exchange
remittances; (3) preventing tax avoidance; (4) preventing packing licensing; and (5)
protecting local employment. Cabanellas, supra note 45, at 41. The foreign trade,
restrictive trade practices, and foreign exchange laws usually constitute mandatory laws
to all technology licenses. Beier, supra note 3, at 168. The parties cannot, therefore,
contract out of them. Id.
133This result is not necessarily detrimental since forum law could be beneficial to
one's case.
134 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 62, § 187 cmt. g.
135 These considerations were first put forth by Robert Leflar. ROBERT A. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW (3d. 1977). The Restatement (Second) adopted all but one of
his choice-influencing considerations. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 61, at 36.
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results, and simplification of the judicial task. 36 These correspond
to principles (a), (f), and (g), respectively. Principle (f) is
indifferent as to what law to apply. It only favors a "hard" rule so
that all contracting parties know what to expect if they do not
specify a law. Principle (g) leans in the direction of applying the
law of the forum.'
Comment (j) to section 6, however, cautions
that courts should not overemphasize this principle because to do
so would sacrifice desirable results in many instances.'
Finally,
principle (a) emphasizes that choice-of-law rules should strive to
make interstate and international systems function well together.'39
Additionally, these rules should seek to further harmonious
relations and commercial interchange between the various
countries.'4 Principle (a) can support any position given certain
underlying facts; but applying forum law satisfies this principle in
every situation because it precludes a forum from interpreting
and/or applying a law with which it is usually not familiar.
Although the methodology of the Restatement (Second) is
simple, its application is not. A court should first determine all of
the potentially applicable laws by applying section 188(2). For
international intellectual property licenses, contacts (c) and (e) are
the most important. Each different possibility should then be
evaluated according to the section 6 principles. The law that best
promotes section 6 principles should be the proper law of the
contract. Although sounding simple, difficulty occurs when
weighing section 6 principles because they conflict with each
other. Which principles count more? Should protecting the
parties' expectations carry more weight than state interests? These
questions go unanswered. Because of this difficulty, many U.S.
courts ignore the section 6 principles and simply use section
188(2) to count contacts. 4 ' Whichever state has the most tallies
gets its law applied. This confusion has led the Restatement
136

Id.

137 Id. at 209 ("It will usually be easier for the forum court to apply its own law

than any other."). Id.
138 RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
139 Id. § 6 cmt. d.
140

supra note 62, § 6 cmt. j.

Id.

141 Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective
on the Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REv. 653, 687-88 (1995).
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(Second) to represent the "softest" of the three approaches. The
EEC Convention's approach limits its analysis to considering the
characteristic performance of a contract. There is no consideration
of forum interests or of other interested countries. Moreover, the
EEC Convention does not consider choice-influencing
considerations. The addition of government interest analysis and
choice-influencing considerations in the Restatement (Second)
creates a situation whereby a U.S. court can reach nearly any result
using the motley medley of principles and contacts embodied in
sections 6 and 188(2).42
C. Japan
In contrast to the closest connection approach of the EEC
Convention and the most significant relationship rule of the
Restatement (Second), Japan's conflict of laws applies a "hard"
inflexible rule. In the absence of party choice, the proper law of
the contract is the country's law where the contracting took
place. 43 Where the place of contracting occurred in different
places or when the place of contracting cannot be ascertained, the
country where the offer was made or dispatched is considered the
place of contracting.' 44 Finally, if the offeree, at the time of
acceptance, does not know from where the offer was made, the
place of the45 offeror's domicile is deemed to be the place of
contracting.
The rationale behind this rule is that the contracting parties
would have chosen the country's law where the contracting
occurred if they had considered it.'4 As explained before,147 the
reason contracting parties do not express a choice in international
industrial property licenses is not because they have not
considered it but because they could not come to an agreement on
this point. Applying the rule in all cases invariably frustrates the

142

Id. at 717.

143 Horei art. 7(2), translatedin KITAGAWA, supra note 74.
144 Horei art. 9(2), translated in KITAGAWA, supra note 74; Fujita, supra note 85,

at 5-54, 5-55.
145

Id.

146 Untiedt, supra note 82, at 209.
147

See text accompanying supra notes 91-93.
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expectations of some contracting parties. The place of contracting
will in many cases have only a superficial relationship to the
industrial property license and to the parties. Moreover, this
"hard" rule ignores the significant and legitimate interests of other
countries which may have greater relation to and interest in the
contracting parties, the subject of the contract, or the effects of the
contract.
Despite its harshness in individual cases, the rule has its
advantages.
The most important being that it provides
predictability, uniformity, and certainty to contracting parties. The
rule precludes a court from having to identify the concerns of
interested jurisdictions, the concerns of the forum, and the interests
of the parties. Additionally, a court does not confront the
difficulty of weighing and comparing the different issues against
one another. As evinced by the Restatement (Second) approach,
this comparison is no easy task. Finally, the rule denies a court the
luxury of preferring the law of the forum.
V. Forum Shopping
Section IV discussed the different approaches taken by the
EEC Convention, the United States, and Japan when contracting
parties fail to express a choice-of-law in their industrial property
license. Along the spectrum between soft and hard rules, the
Restatement (Second) approach is the "softest," preferring case-bycase adjudication over uniformity and predictability. 14' The EEC
Convention's approach lies in the middle with its rebuttable
characteristic performance presumption and closest connection
formulation. Japan's approach is the "hardest" and mandates a
court to apply the law of the place of contracting. But what are the
implications of these differences? This section examines what can
happen under the varying approaches.
A. The Scenario
Suppose the following fact pattern: two companies, Japanese
company Alpha and French company Beta, agree on a licensing
148 Even so, contracting parties should be aware that in international licenses, there
might be a slight tendency for U.S. courts to apply forum law because of the existence in
the Restatement (Second) of government interest analysis.
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deal in which Alpha agrees to license exclusively the remaining
five years of its U.S. patent on widgets to Beta for exploitation in
the United States. Company representatives for Alpha and Beta
negotiated the deal in Singapore while both were attending a
widget manufacturing conference. According to the terms of the
deal, Beta will manufacture the widgets in France and then ship
them to its subsidiary in the U.S. where they will be eventually
sold. In exchange for a lower royalty rate, Alpha agrees not to
provide Beta with any technical assistance. The patent license
contains a standard clause regarding third-party infringement. It
provides, in pertinent part, that "if any third party shall, in the
reasonable opinion of either party, infringe the licensed patent,
such party shall promptly notify the other party . ,,14' Alpha and
Beta could not agree on a choice-of-law. A graphic illustration
here is useful.

Exclusive license
Licensor
(Japan)q

of U.S. patent

Licensee

(France)

negotiated in
Singapore

Product
manufactured
in France and
shipped to
United States

Product sold inUnited Stattes

Cutthroat is a U.S. company interested in widgets. It knows
that Alpha owns the widget patent, but it also knows it expires in
five years. To be able to sell widgets the moment the patent
149 James S. Hilboldt, Jr., The Patent License: Key Clauses, TECHNOLOGY
LICENSING AND LITIGATION 293, 321 (1996).
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expires, Cutthroat buys all the materials for making them in the
U.S. and even partially assembles them in its plant in Texas.
Cutthroat sends the partially-assembled widgets to Mexico where
the final assembly occurs. Alpha, the former employer of
Cutthroat's CEO, is aware of Cutthroat's activity but does not
inform Beta because under U.S. patent law Cutthroat's actions do
not constitute patent infringement.150 French patent law, however,
considers Cutthroat's activities infringing. 5'
The day after Alpha's patent expires, Cutthroat begins selling
its widgets in the U.S. and makes $10 million its first year. Beta
discovers Cutthroat's activity a year later, but Cutthroat has since
gone bankrupt.
Beta also uncovers Alpha's knowledge of
Cutthroat's activity and sues Alpha for breach of contract. 152
B. The Problem
Because of the different choice-of-law approaches taken by the
three systems, the proper law of the contract is dependent on
where Beta decides to sue.'53 If Beta sues in Japan, a Japanese
court will look to the place of contracting to determine the proper
law of the contract. In this case, the place of contracting was
Singapore; therefore, the court will use the law of Singapore to
interpret the contract.
If Beta sues in France, a French court will use the EEC
Convention's characteristic performance approach to determine
the proper law of the contract. Using the licensor's actions as the
characteristic performance, the proper law of the contract would be
Japanese law. If the licensee's actions are characteristic, the
resulting law of the contract would be France. Finally, if the
150 See Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 532 (1972) (stating
that partialassemblies that have no significant noninfringing purpose constitute patent
infringement). For purpose of this example, assume that the partial assembly has
significant noninfringing uses.
11 ULMER, supra note 10, at 13.
152 This issue here should be governed by contract law. First, it concerns an issue
of breach. Second, it is a question of interpretation. Did the parties intend for
infringement to mean infringement of the U.S. patent or infringement as that term is
used in France? Finally, this is not an infringement suit. Beta is suing Alpha not
Cutthroat.

153 In actuality, the first to file suit and where he files will determine which conflict
of laws principles get applied and hence will determine the proper law of the contract.
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characteristic performance is exploitation of the industrial property
right, that exploitation occurred in the U.S., and, therefore, U.S.
contract law should be the proper law of the contract. The French
court would probably invoke Article 4(5) in this case because the
United States and France have much closer connections to the
situation than Japan. Of the two, French law would seem the
better choice under the EEC Convention. The obligations of Beta
Beta
weigh much more heavily than those of Alpha.
manufactures, ships, sells, and exploits the invention. Alpha's
actions, on the other hand, are passive, limited primarily to
receiving royalties.
The EEC Convention discounts the
significance of royalty payments in favor of the performance for
which the payment is due. 5 4 Additionally, despite the eventual
sale occurring in the U.S., certain commentators would find the
fact that the license is exclusive and the fact that the
manufacturing occurred in France persuasive enough to make
French law the proper law of the contract.5
Finally, if Beta sues in the United States, a court will use the
Restatement (Second) most significant relationship rules.
Applying section 188(2)'s contact factors yields the following
candidates: Singapore, the United States, France, and Japan.
Section 188(3)'s presumption does not apply since the place of
performance differed from the place of negotiation. The next step
156
is to analyze the contact points in light of Section 6 principles.
Principles (d)-(f) lean toward using either French or Japanese law
as the proper law of the contract since the contracting parties
probably did not expect to have U.S. contract law govern their
agreement. Expecting U.S. patent law to govern Alpha's patent is
reasonable, but expecting U.S. contract law to govern breach
between two non-American company may not be. Principles (a)
and (g), on the other hand, tilt in favor of U.S. law as the proper
154 Giuliano and Lagarde, supra note 26, at 374.
... ULMER, supra note
156 They are: (a) the

10, at 101-02; Modiano, supra note 104, at 23.
needs of the interstate and international systems; (b) the
relevant policies of the forum; (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue; (d) the
protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field
of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result; and (g) ease in the
determination and application of the law to be applied. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra
note 62, § 6(2).

N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

[Vol. 22

law of the contract. Using U.S. law best serves the needs and
harmony of the international system because it would not require a
U.S. court to adjudicate or interpret French or Japanese law. It
would therefore be simpler for a U.S. court to apply U.S. law.
Moreover, since U.S. patent law governs all disputes concerning
the patent right itself, using U.S. contract law would subject the
license agreement to only one law. Finally, the United States is a
neutral forum in that neither party would have to go to the other's
home country.
The other Section 6 principles require examining the interests
of the forum and interested countries. As for the forum, the U.S.
has an interest in its patent holders being treated fairly and having
their U.S. patents rights protected.'57 The U.S. also has an interest
in resolving the dispute between the parties since it was the center
of all major activity. Beta's sales are in the U.S. as are
Cutthroat's. Cutthroat's partial assembly of the widgets also
occurred in the U.S., and the underlying subject matter of the
license is a U.S. patent. Finally, the U.S. has an interest in
maintaining its integrity as a global marketplace. Predictability is
crucial in this regard. Allowing foreign law to govern this
situation when there are so many contacts with the U.S. would
create unpredictability and undermine the integrity of the U.S.
marketplace. Although both Japan and France have a general
interest in protecting its citizens in license agreements, both parties
directed their actions and activities toward the United States.
Alpha owns and licenses a U.S. patent, and Beta exploits that
patent in the United States. It thus would not be unreasonable to
have U.S. law govern their license agreement. After following the
Restatement (Second) approach, a court would conclude that the
United States is the country with the most significant relationship
to the transaction and parties and apply U.S. law to the
international industrial property license.
Filing in three countries yields three different results. All
caused, first, by the parties not selecting a choice of law, and

157 Both the Paris Convention and TRIPS mandate national treatment for Alpha as
long as it meets all of the formalities of U.S. patent law. Paris Convention, supra note
11, art. 2; TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, art. 3, 33 I.L.M. at 85-86; Id. art. 41, 33
I.L.M. at 99-100.
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second, by the lack of uniformity between the choice-of-law rules
of the three systems. As a result, this situation may encourage
Beta to forum shop for the country which will apply the law most
favorable to it. Beta must keep in mind, however, that each
country has its own rules for interpreting contracts and for
consequences of breach. 58 There may also be a bias in a particular
forum for a party from that forum. A French court may be more
inclined to find that the term infringement includes what would be
considered infringement in France, especially when the aggrieved
party, Beta, is a French corporation. In any event, leaving the law
of the contract up to where the suit is filed and then to subsequent
court determination can turn out to be a risky proposition.
VI. Conclusion
As explored in detail in Part V, differences in the choice-oflaw approaches cause problems when parties fail to articulate a
clear governing law. Even within the countries themselves,
confusion exists regarding how to determine the law of the
contract. This will continue until choice-of-law rules become
uniform and cease being territorial. The easiest method of
avoiding this confusion altogether is to explicitly provide a choiceof-law clause in every industrial property license. This cannot be
stressed enough. Failure to do so can result in unexpected
consequences, as illustrated above in Part V.
Another point to remember is that the law of the contract
governs only certain aspects of the industrial property license. It
governs the formation, termination, interpretation and validity,
rights and duties of the parties, the mode of performance, and the
consequences of breaches.
Issues relating to the industrial
property right itself are subject to the law of the protecting
country. This dual approach for industrial property licenses exists
158 Differences exist between the three laws, especially since Japan and France are
civil law countries while the U.S. is a common law country. As one commentator noted,
Faced with a problem in contract, the Common lawyer is as likely as not to try
to solve it with an implied term. But the Civil lawyer will probably resort to a
rule, whether it is a broad and fundamental precept... or one derived from the
nature of obligation or of contract in general .... or finally, one derived from
the nature of the contract in question.
BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 50 (2d ed. 1992).
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because there is no such thing as an international patent or
trademark. Each country determines the conditions prior to the
granting of an industrial property right and, for the most part, these
conditions are unique to the granting country. There have been
efforts to harmonize industrial property and TRIPS is a good first
step. There is still, however, a long way to go. Until then,
licensing, will continue to play a significant role in penetrating
foreign markets.

